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ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES AND I.R.C. 2036(c)
JOHN L. NELSONt
INTRODUCTION
It is said that there are only two certainties in life: death and
taxes. A third certainty is that there will always be people try-
ing to avoid the other two certainties. In the case of the estate
planner, there is an admission that death will occur. One of
the estate planner's goals is to prevent the imposition of taxes
from occurring simultaneously with death.' The Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS), acting pursuant to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986,2 makes its last attempt at taxing an individual at
that individual's death. As a result, there has been a constant
struggle between the IRS and the estate planner.
Recent and significant action in this struggle has been taken
on behalf of the IRS by Congress. Section 2036(c) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code came into law with passage of the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1987. 3 The statute
was significantly modified by the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act (TAMRA) of 1988. 4 The purpose of the statute is
to prevent the use of an estate planning technique known as an
''estate freeze."
Estate planners use an estate freeze to lock in the value of a
client's asset at a certain point in time and to have any further
appreciation in value of that asset escape estate tax upon the
client's death. Typically, the asset will be a successful business
or an interest in real property expected to have substantial fu-
ture appreciation. While the client is giving up the future ap-
preciation of the asset, it is usually the intent of the client to
t J.D. cum laude William Mitchell College of Law, 1986; LL.M. William Mitch-
ell College of Law, 1988. Mr. Nelson is a member of the Minnesota Bar and an
Advanced Financial Planning Manager with I.D.S. Financial Services Inc.
1. See D. FREEMAN, ESTATE TAX FREEZE § 1.02(1) (1989).
2. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-9602 (West 1989).
3. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat.
1330 (1987) [hereinafter OBRA].
4. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102
Stat. 3342 (1988) [hereinafter TAMRA].
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continue to receive income from and to keep control of the
business or the real property.
Congress was quite successful in accomplishing its goal
when it enacted I.R.C. section 2036(c). 5 The traditional estate
freeze transactions have clearly been eliminated by the statute.
In fact, Congress may have been too successful. Many non-
freezing transactions come within the general rule of I.R.C.
section 2036(c). While several safe harbors have been created
for certain nonabusive transactions, there remain several un-
certainties about the scope of the new law.
Two basic uncertainties can best be understood by posing
the following questions: First, what estate planning techniques
are available that will successfully keep post-transfer apprecia-
tion from being taxed in the client's estate, while at the same
time allowing the client to receive income from and/or control
of the asset being transferred? Second, how can you structure
nonfreezing asset transfer transactions so that I.R.C. section
2036(c) is avoided? These questions, and some possible an-
swers, are the focus of this article.
The first part of this article will describe several of the estate
planning techniques used by practitioners prior to the passage
of I.R.C. section 2036(c). Next, the article will analyze I.R.C.
section 2036(c), describing the terms of the statute and when
they will apply. Unresolved questions about the meaning of
certain terms will also be discussed. Finally, the article will an-
alyze what types of asset transfer techniques may still be avail-
able in spite of I.R.C. section 2036(c).
I. EXAMPLES OF COMMON ESTATE FREEZES
Prior to passage of I.R.C. section 2036(c), there were several
estate freezing techniques used by estate planners to keep ap-
preciation of property out of their clients' estates. A review of
these techniques will aid in understanding the new statute.
What follows is a brief description of three estate freezing
techniques.
5. See, e.g., Salo, Death Watch for Estate Planning, PERS. FIN. PLAN., Sept./Oct.
1989, at 4; Blattmachr & Gans, Putting the Heat on Freezes, PROB. & PROP., May/June
1988, at 12; Magner & Tencza, The Freeze Gets Iced, 39 TAx NOTES 505 (April 25,
1988).
[Vol. 16
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A. Corporate Freezes
Prior to passage of I.R.C. section 2036(c), the freezing of the
value of a corporation involved a nontaxable reorganization
under I.R.C. section 368(a)(1). Specifically, the corporation
would recapitalize its stock.6 The typical person who would
benefit from a recapitalization was an individual who owned a
corporation and who wanted to have subsequent generations
continue the business. The individual intended to transfer
control of the business to the next generation at death or at
some other point in the future, and wanted to do so with a
minimum of tax. In addition to remaining in control, the indi-
vidual wanted to continue receiving income from the corpora-
tion. The business was successful, and was expected to
substantially appreciate in value.
Upon learning of these facts, the estate planner could sug-
gest a recapitalization to achieve the individual's goals. An ex-
ample of this recapitalization would be to create two classes of
stock, preferred and common. The preferred stock would be
issued to the present owner of the business. The preferred
stock would have a value that approximated the value of the
corporation at the time of the corporate recapitalization.
7 It
would be preferred as to dividends in an amount that would
give the owner the desired income stream. The dividends
would be noncumulative, giving the owner flexibility in deter-
mining how much income was to be distributed.8 The pre-
ferred stock would also possess a majority of the voting power
of the corporation. Finally, the preferred stock would have a
liquidation preference as to the amount of its value when
issued.
The second class of stock would be common stock. This
stock would be transferred to the children. It would have no
6. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E) (1988).
7. Proper valuation of the stock is essential to ensure that the recapitalization's
gift tax consequences will be minimized. See D. FREEMAN, supra note 1, § 2.10, at 2-
30.
8. In fact, one of the problems the IRS had with the use of the estate freeze was
that the nonpayment of dividends further increased the value of the common stock at
essentially no transfer tax cost. See H.R. REP. No. 795, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 422
(1988) [hereinafter TAMRA H. REP.] (stating "section 2036(c) was directed at two
concerns. The first is that the creation or transfer of disproportionate interests in a
business or other property often allows the transfer of wealth outside the transfer tax
system, . . . because of action or inaction of the transferor or transferee after that
transfer"). Id.
1990]
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dividend rights, or would have dividend rights secondary to
the rights of the preferred stock. Its liquidation rights would
be the entire value of the corporation, less the preferred stock
preference. 9
As a result of the recapitalization, the present owner's inter-
est in the corporation would be frozen. The preferred stock
was included in the owner's estate. However, the value of the
preferred stock was the value of the corporation at the time of
the recapitalization. Any increase in value of the corporation
subsequent to the recapitalization would result in an increase
in value of the common stock, and thus was not included in the
present owner's estate.
The use of corporate recapitalization as an estate freezing
technique was closely scrutinized by the IRS.' 0 The IRS made
several arguments in an attempt to include the appreciated
value of the corporation in the decedent's estate. It was gener-
ally unsuccessful with those arguments."t
The law prior to I.R.C. section 2036(c) was that with careful
drafting of the recapitalization agreement, this estate freezing
technique would be successful and would avoid causing any
post-transfer appreciation to be taxed in the individual's
estate.
B. Partnership Freezes
The concept of the partnership freeze is similar to that of a
corporate recapitalization. With a partnership, the two inter-
ests created were a limited interest and a general interest. The
limited interest was similar to the preferred stock. It was spe-
cially allocated a certain amount of income, 12 which gave the
owner the desired cash flow. It had a preference on with-
9. As a result, all of the appreciation resulting after the recapitalization will be-
long to the owners of the common stock.
10. See Abbin, Taking the Temperature of Asset Value Freeze Approaches: What's Hot,
What's Not, 66 TAXES 3 (Jan. 1988).
11. See, e.g., Estate of Boykin v. Commissioner, 53 TCM (CCH) 345 (1987). In
Boykin, a corporation had two classes of stock, each of which was viewed separately
for determining a retained interest. Decedent owned 100% of nonvoting stock, but
0% of the voting stock. Therefore, the court held that there was no retained interest
in the voting stock and it was excluded from decedent's estate. Id. at 349.
12. I.R.C. § 704(b) allows taxpayers to specially allocate income, gain, loss, de-
ductions and credits of the partnership. The laws regarding this special allocation
are extremely complex. See W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXA-
TION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 10.02 (1977).
[Vol. 16
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drawal equal to the value of the partnership on the date the
limited interest was created. The total value of the limited in-
terest was equal to the value of the partnership when the two
separate interests were created.
The general interest was similar to the common stock. It
had a liquidation preference equal to the entire value of the
partnership, less the limited interest preference.
As with the corporate recapitalization, it was necessary that
the agreement be carefully drafted to avoid a successful attack
by the IRS. For estate planners, this was a relatively new estate
planning technique, with little guidance or reliable authority.' 3
C. Sale of a Remainder Interest
Estate freezes utilizing the sale of a remainder interest usu-
ally involved property such as real estate. Typically, the estate
planner's client owned real property which was expected to ap-
preciate substantially. The client wanted to retain until death
both the property and the income generated by the property.
At death, the client desired that the property transfer to the
next generation.
The estate planner could suggest that the client sell a re-
mainder interest in the property to the children. The client
would own the life estate. Once the entire value of the prop-
erty was determined, 14 the value of each interest was deter-
mined by using the appropriate valuation table.' 5 The table
valued each interest based upon the age (and therefore the life
expectancy) of the holder of the life estate.' 6
As the holder of the life estate, the client had full control
over the property, subject to state law restrictions such as not
committing waste. 17 All income from the property belonged to
13. See D. FREEMAN, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 1-13.
14. As with corporate and partnership freezes, proper valuation is essential. See
Moses, Intra-family Sales of Remainder Interests Can Freeze Asset Values and Reduce Estate
Taxes, 8 EST. PLAN. 22-23 (Jan. 1981).
15. Prior to passage of OBRA, the appropriate valuation table was found in
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f) (1984). OBRA § 5031 enacted I.R.C. § 7520 which
prescribes that valuation tables are to be updated monthly, based on life expectancy
and the appropriate interest rate that is in effect for the month the valuation event
occurs. See I.R.C. § 7520(a)-(c) (West 1989).
16. Note that the life estate can be a joint life estate. For example, the remainder
interest can be set up to be transferred after the death of both the transferee and the
transferee's spouse.
17. See Beliveau v. Beliveau, 217 Minn. 235, 14 N.W.2d 360 (1944) (duties of life
1990]
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the life tenant and all deductions, such as depreciation, were
taken by the life tenant.
Upon the death of the client, the property passed to the
holders of the remainder interest. As the client had no interest
in the property at death, its value was not included in the cli-
ent's estate.18 The money received by the client upon the orig-
inal sale of the remainder interest, and any income from it, was
included in the client's estate, unless it had been removed from
the estate by spending it or giving it away.
As with business freezes, a sale of a remainder interest was
subject to close scrutiny and challenge by the IRS. Careful
planning was essential, and even then this was an aggressive
estate planning technique.' 9 However, if successful, it could
significantly reduce a client's taxable estate.
II. CODE SECTION 2036(c)
A. A Brief History
The original version of the estate freeze legislation was en-
acted by the House of Representatives in October 1987.20 The
House Committee Report2' made it clear that the House was
tenant include duty to not permit waste, make necessary and reasonable repairs, and
to pay current taxes).
18. In general, an individual's gross estate includes all property in which the de-
cedent owned an interest at death. See I.R.C. § 2033 (West 1989).
19. See Gradow v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 808 (1987) for a decision shedding
considerable doubt on the usefulness of this estate planning technique.
20. See Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess.
§ 10108, 133 CONG. REc. H9185, 9332 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1987). The estate freeze
provisions would have been added as new I.R.C. § 2211(b), reading as follows:
(b) Limitations on Valuation Freezes.-
(1) In General.-If-
(A) any person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise, and
(B) such person in effect transfers a disproportionate share of the po-
tential appreciation in the enterprise, then the transferred property shall be
included in his gross estate.
(2) Definitions.-For purposes of this subsection-
(A) Substantial Interest.-A person holds a substantial interest in an
enterprise if such person owns (directly or indirectly) 10 percent or more of
the voting power or income stream, or both, in such enterprise.
(B) Exception For Certain Nonfamily Transfers.-Paragraph (1) shall
not apply to any transfer to any person (other than a member of the trans-
feror's family) if such transfer is for full and adequate consideration.
(C) Treatment of Family Members.-An individual shall be treated as
owning any interest in an enterprise which is owned (directly or indirectly)
by any member of such individual's family.
21. H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2313-378, 657-60. In the Report Reasons for Change sec-
[Vol. 16
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concerned with corporate and partnership valuation freezes
when it passed this law. The Senate tax bill, on the other hand,
did not include any provisions regarding estate freezes. 22 The
subsequent Conference compromise, which resulted in OBRA,
significantly expanded the scope of I.R.C. section 2036(c).
I.R.C. section 2036(c) was then amended by TAMRA. 23
This amendment made several major changes. First, it dealt
with any post-transfer transfers of the enterprise. Second, it
created certain statutory safe harbor exceptions to the applica-
tion of I.R.C. section 2036(c). Third, it dealt with the payment
of estate taxes due to the transferred interest. Finally, it pro-
vided a period in which any prior transfers could be undone to
avoid the application of I.R.C. section 2036(c).
There have been no changes to I.R.C. section 2036(c) subse-
quent to TAMRA. However, in 1989, the Senate Finance
Committee proposed a bill which would have repealed I.R.C.
section 2036(c) in its entirety, retroactive to the original enact-
ment of the statute. 24 No such provision was passed by the
Senate or the House, and the repeal never became law.
No regulations have been issued by the IRS in regard to
I.R.C. section 2036(c). However, IRS Notice 89-9925 has been
issued which interprets the meaning of several ambiguous
terms and provides safe harbors in addition to those statutorily
prescribed.
tion, it gives examples of both partnership and corporate freezes and says that these
freezes resemble a retained life estate, and should be treated as such. Id. at 2313-
659. In addition, the Conference Report defines an enterprise as a business con-
ducted in any form, whether it be through a corporation, partnership or proprietor-
ship. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1987 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2313-1245, 1742.
22. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987 as amended by S. 1920, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S18034 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1987).
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24. See Senate Finance Committee's Explanation of Title VI, reprinted in Revenue
Reconciliation Bill of 1989, CCH Special 4, Vol. 76, No. 42, pt. 3, at 281 (CCH Oct.
11, 1989). Among the reasons for the repeal the Senate Finance Committee noted,
was concern
that the statute's complexity, breadth, and vagueness posed an unreasona-
ble impediment to the transfer of family businesses .... Many taxpayers
uncertain about the scope of these rules have refrained from legitimate in-
trafamily transactions.... The committee is convinced that additional tech-
nical and substantive modifications to the current rules would exacerbate
rather than solve the current problems with the statute.
Id.
25. I.R.S. Notice 89-99, 1989-38 I.R.B. 4 [hereinafter Notice 89-99].
1990]
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B. Description of the Statute
1. In General
The purpose of I.R.C. section 2036(c) is to prevent the re-
moval of appreciation of an asset from an individual's estate if
that individual continues to retain control or receive income
from the asset. Generally, the new law applies when the owner
of a substantial interest in an enterprise transfers a part of that
interest, along with a disproportionately large share of the po-
tential appreciation in that interest, while retaining income
and/or rights in the enterprise.26 If such a transfer is made,
then the retention of the interest is treated as retention of the
enjoyment of the transferred property.2 7 Therefore, pursuant
to I.R.C. section 2036(a), the value of the entire enterprise is
included in the individual's estate, provided the other elements
of I.R.C. section 2036(a) are met.28
2. Substantial Interest
The only term that the statute itself defines is "substantial
interest."2 9 A person holds a substantial interest in an enter-
prise if that person owns, either directly or indirectly, ten per-
cent or more of the voting power, or income stream, or both,
in such enterprise.30
There is a special rule of attribution in the statute. An indi-
vidual is treated as owning any interest in an enterprise that is
owned directly or indirectly by any member of such individ-
ual's family.3' The statute defines family to include an individ-
26. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1) (West 1989).
27. Id.
28. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (West 1989) reads as follows:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under
which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before
his death-
1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or
2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom.
Id.
29. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(A) (West 1989).
30. Id.
31. Id.
[Vol. 16
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ual's spouse, any lineal descendant of the individual or the
individual's spouse, any parent or grandparent of such individ-
ual, and any spouse of any of the foregoing. A relationship by
legal adoption shall be treated as one by blood.32
There are special rules regarding spouses. The statute reads
that "[e]xcept as provided in regulations, an individual and
such individual's spouse shall be treated as 1 person. "33 The
Conference Report to TAMRA3 4 indicates that spouses are to
be treated as one if interests in enterprises are transferred be-
tween them in a manner that is not taxable, such as transfers
qualifying for the marital deduction.3 5 Similarly, if the transfer
between the spouses is taxable, then the spousal unity rule will
not apply.3 6 A significant portion of Notice 89-99 is devoted to
interpreting the spousal unity rule.
In its essence, I.R.C section 2036(c)'s spousal unity rule is
designed to cause inclusion in at least one spouse's estate, and
only one spouse's estate, should all of its elements be met. In
fact, Notice 89-99 says that the principal purpose of the
spousal unity rule is to identify the transferor for purposes of
I.R.C. section 2036(c).3
7
The statute and the relevant congressional reports are silent
on the use of double attribution.38 In addition, the Conference
Report to OBRA39 does not fully clarify what is meant by "in-
directly." The OBRA Conference Report does say that an in-
terest held indirectly by a person includes interests held by an
entity in which such person has an interest.40
Notice 89-99 does indicate how the IRS will apply indirect
entity attribution. Notice 89-99 gives four examples of indirect
entity attribution. For all entities except for an estate or trust,
32. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(B) (West 1989).
33. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(3)(C) (West 1989).
34. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1104, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5048 [hereinafter TAMRA CONF. REP.].
35. Id. at 5136.
36. Id.
37. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 14.
38. For example, if a child owns stock, the attribution rules of I.R.C.
§ 2036(c)(3)(B) would attribute ownership of that stock to the child's parent. Would
attribution be applied a second time to attribute ownership of that stock down to a
brother or sister of the child? See I.R.C. § 318(a)(5) (1988) for an example of double
attribution rules.
39. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1987 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2313-1245 [hereinafter OBRA CONF. REP.].
40. Id. at 1742.
1990]
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any interest is considered as owned proportionately by the
owners of the corresponding interest in the entity.4' With an
estate, any interest owned by the estate is considered as being
owned proportionately by the beneficiaries of the interest.42
Two separate rules are applied to trusts. Any interest in the
income stream of an enterprise owned by a trust is considered
as owned by the beneficiaries to the extent they are eligible or
entitled, presently or in the future, to receive trust income or
principal. 43 Any voting power exercisable with respect to
property held in trust, other than voting power held in a fiduci-
ary capacity, is considered as held by the transferor to the ex-
tent the transferor or a member of the transferor's family is
entitled to exercise such power.44
In addition to these attribution rules, Notice 89-99 also indi-
cates that the IRS is willing to provide safe harbors for situa-
tions in which the transferor owns more than ten percent of an
enterprise, but a significant number of unrelated parties also
own interests, which limits the potential for an abusive transfer
to occur.45
3. Enterprise
One of the most significant terms in the new law is "enter-
prise." While this term is not defined in the statute, it has been
indicated elsewhere that the term is to be given extremely
broad scope. The OBRA Conference Report indicates that an
enterprise includes a business or other property which may
produce income or gain.46 The usual focus of an estate freeze
is on income-producing property which has the potential for
substantial appreciation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
41. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Footnote 19 of Notice 89-99 says that the IRS
is considering a safe harbor for those situations when more than 50% of the
voting power and more than 50% of the value of the equity interests in the
enterprise are held by parties that are not related to the transferor and do
not hold a substantial interest in the enterprise. This safe harbor would
apply only if the equity owners unrelated to the transferor receive the same
treatment in the transaction as those equity owners who are related to the
transferor.
Id.
46. OBRA CONF. REP., supra note 39, at 1742.
[Vol. 16
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conceive of any property that could be used in a freeze that
does not fit the definition of an enterprise.
In spite of the broad definition of enterprise found in the
OBRA Conference Report, the IRS has chosen to create ex-
ceptions. Notice 89-99 defines an enterprise as any arrange-
ment, relationship, or activity that has significant business or
investment aspects. 47 Arrangements treated as trades or busi-
nesses under I.R.C. section 162, or property held for the pro-
duction of income within the meaning of I.R.C. section 212,
are considered activities which have significant business or in-
vestment aspects. 48
In contrast, an arrangement with respect to personal use
property, as defined in I.R.C. section 1275(b)(3), is presumed
to lack significant business or investment aspects. 49 If the ar-
rangement involves an individual's personal residence or a life
insurance contract, as defined in I.R.C. section 7702, that pre-
sumption is conclusive. 50 In all other cases, the presumption
may be rebutted by demonstrating that the arrangement's per-
sonal use aspects are subordinate to its business or investment
aspects.
51
4. Rights in the Enterprise
The OBRA Conference Report defines the term "rights in
the enterprise" as including voting rights, conversion rights,
liquidation rights, warrants, options and other rights of
value. 52 Thus, if an individual owns any of these contract
rights, then the individual is deemed to own the underlying
property interest. Neither the OBRA Conference Report nor
the statute offer guidance on how these rights are to be treated
relative to actual equity interests. Another question that needs
to be answered is how broad the language "other rights of
value" will be interpreted.
53
47. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. OBRA CONF. REP., supra note 39, at 1742.
53. Would an option to acquire voting stock be treated the same as ownership of
the voting stock itself? How would you compare an interest that has voting control to
one that has a preferential right to income? What are other rights of value? These
and many other questions remain unanswered even after Notice 89-99.
1990)
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Notice 89-99 does provide some limited exceptions to what
otherwise may be considered other rights of value. One exam-
ple of a potential retained right is the right to serve as a trustee
or other fiduciary. However, Notice 89-99 indicates that this is
not a right within the meaning of I.R.C. section 2036(c). 54
Notice 89-99 indicates that other rights of value are limited
to rights that are intrinsic to an equity interest in an enterprise
and similar to the rights specifically mentioned in the legisla-
tive history.55
5. Transfers
In order for the statute to apply, a person has to "in effect"
make a transfer. The term "transfer" is defined in the OBRA
Conference Report as including all transactions whereby prop-
erty is passed to or conferred upon another, regardless of the
means and device employed in its accomplishment. 56 As with
the term enterprise, Congress has chosen to define the term
"transfer" broadly. It is difficult to conceive of any means to
directly transfer property from one person to another without
coming within the definition of a transfer.
While the term transfer is defined in the OBRA Conference
Report, there is no guidance as to what is meant by the term
"in effect." Perhaps it is meant to cover indirect transfers that
may not come within the broad definition of transfer. An ex-
ample of this would be where an individual owns one hundred
percent of the common stock in a corporation. The corpora-
tion adopts a plan of recapitalization where the stockholder ex-
changes common shares for preferred. The stockholder's
children receive from the corporation the new common stock
at its current fair market value. The preferred stock has in-
come and voting rights, while the common stock has rights to
subsequent appreciation. While the stockholder has not made
a direct transfer to the children of a disproportionately large
54. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 11.
55. Id. The Notice indicates that the following are voting rights:
1. the right to vote corporate stock;
2. the right as a limited partner to select, and consent to the acts of, a
general partner;
3. the right as a general partner to participate in the management of
the partnership;
The Notice indicates that this list of voting rights is not exclusive and that rights
-substantially similar" to those listed would also qualify. See id.
56. See OBRA CONF. REP., supra note 39, at 1742.
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share of potential appreciation, an in effect transfer was
made.57
Another example of an in effect transfer may be where a par-
ent buys a life interest in property and the child buys the re-
mainder interest, and the source of the children's funds for the
purchase is a gift from the parent. It may be argued that the
parent has in effect made a transfer of the remainder interest
to the child.
The new statute applies regardless of the identity of the
transferee; it does not have to be a family member. However,
for a transfer other than to family members, there is an excep-
tion to the applicability of I.R.C. section 2036(c) if the transfer
is a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth. 58 This relief provision does not apply to a
transfer of property to a younger generation within the family,
which is the usual object of an estate freeze. However, there
are special rules applicable to transfers between family
members.
The statute does have an adjustment for transfers to a family
member where the family member provides consideration. In
order for the adjustment to apply, two requirements must be
met. First, the family member must provide consideration in
money or money's worth for the interest in an enterprise. 59
Second, the consideration must have originally belonged to
the family member and must never have been received or ac-
quired directly or indirectly from the transferor for less than
full and adequate consideration. 60
If these requirements are met, then a portion of the enter-
prise is not included in the transferor's estate. This amount is
called by the statute the applicable fraction. This fraction is
defined as follows: 6 1 The numerator is the amount of consid-
eration paid by the family member; The denominator is the
value of the portion of the enterprise which would have been
included in the estate of the transferor, immediately after the
57. See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 5, at 13.
58. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (West 1989) as a general rule does not apply to bona fide
sales for full and adequate consideration. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2) (West 1989) says that
by definition a sale to a family member is not a bona fide sale for full and adequate
consideration.
59. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B)(i)(I) (West 1989).
60. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B)(i)(II) (West 1989).
61. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B)(ii) (West 1989).
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transfer, had this exception not applied.62
The TAMRA Conference Report directs the IRS to promul-
gate regulations appropriate to demonstrate that the consider-
ation originally belonged to the family member and was not
received from the transferor. The Report indicates that the
regulations could provide an elevated standard of proof for
making this demonstration or they could create a presumption
that consideration was received from gifts made by the trans-
feror to the transferee within a certain period of time.
63
In Notice 89-99, the IRS does address these issues. A pre-
sumption is made that consideration furnished by the trans-
feree comes from the transferor. To rebut that presumption, it
must be shown that:
1) The transferee received property from other sources
in an amount sufficient, considering only a reasonable rate
of growth, to enable the transferee to accumulate consider-
ation for the transfer; and
2) The transferee's ability to furnish the consideration
was not dependant on the acquisition or receipt of property
from the transferor during the three years preceding the
transfer.64
The IRS has provided several guides for applying the above
rules.65 One of the most notable is that amounts borrowed
62. For example, assume a parent owns all the common and preferred stock in a
corporation. The parent sells to the child all of the common stock for $100,000, its
fair market value. The entire fair market value of the corporation is $200,000 at the
time of the transfer. The $100,000 consideration furnished by the child was never
received or acquired from the parent for less than full and adequate consideration.
Upon the death of the parent, the corporation is worth $600,000.
Based on these facts, the amount included in the parent's estate would be deter-
mined as follows:
Total value $600,000
Applicable fraction
Numerator (consideration paid) 100,000
Denominator (total amount included) 200,000
Fraction amount 1/2
Total included $300,000
As a result of the transfer, one-half of the post-transfer appreciation has been re-
moved from the parent's estate.
63. See TAMRA CONF. REP., supra note 34, at 5136.
64. Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 16.
65. See id. Notice 89-99 states that
(1) property acquired or received from the transferor includes property ac-
quired or received from the transferor's spouse;
(2) proceeds, income, and gain from property are deemed to be from the
same source as the property from which they issue;
(3) amounts borrowed from the transferor are deemed to be acquired or
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from the transferor are deemed to be acquired or received
from the transferor if the loan is a "gift loan" as defined in
I.R.C. section 7872(f)(3). 66 This would apply in any situation
where a child is buying the common stock of a business from a
parent and the payments of the purchase price are to come out
of the earnings of the business.
In such a situation, if the sale price is not at fair market
value, there would be a partial gift at the time of the sale and
the transfer would not be for full and adequate consideration.
If the interest rate were less than a market rate, the transaction
would similarly be for less than full and adequate considera-
tion. In either event, the entire value of the corporation may
be included in the transferor's estate, even if the value of the
consideration furnished by the transferee is significant. 67
6. Disproportionate
The OBRA Conference Report defines "disproportionately
large share of potential appreciation" as any share of apprecia-
tion in the enterprise that is greater than the share of apprecia-
tion borne by the property retained by the transferor.68 The
potential appreciation transferred and the potential apprecia-
tion retained may not always be easy to determine. For exam-
ple, there could be a situation where the preferred stock was to
have rights to the first $1 million of liquidation proceeds and
rights to all proceeds in excess of $5 million. The common
received from the transferor if acquired pursuant to a "gift loan," as defined
in I.R.C. section 7872(f)(3) of the Code;
(4) amounts borrowed from persons other than the transferor are deemed
to be acquired or received from the transferor to the extent the transferee's
repayment obligation is directly or indirectly guaranteed or collateralized by
the transferor for less than full and aaequate consideration in money or
moneys worth; and
(5) property acquired from the transferor for full and adequate considera-
tion in money or money's worth is deemed to be acquired or received from
the transferor only if such consideration was itself acquired from the trans-
feror, as determined by application of the foregoing rules.
Id. at 16.
66. Id. I.R.C. § 7872 (Supp. IV 1986) generally is concerned with the treatment
of loans at below-market interest rates. I.R.C. § 7872(f)(3) defines a gift loan as any
below-market loan where the foregoing of interest is in the nature of a gift.
67. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 15-16. Rather than an all or nothing ap-
proach, it may be that the transfer would be considered part gift and part for ade-
quate consideration. In the example in note 62, if the transferee paid $50,000 for the
$100,000 valued interest, the numerator of the applicable fraction should be adjusted
accordingly. In the case of a gift loan, the result would not be as easy to determine.
68. See OBRA CONF. REP., supra note 39, at 1742.
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stock would have rights to the proceeds in excess of $1 million
up to $5 million. In such a case, it may not be possible to de-
termine if either class of stock has a disproportionately large
share of potential appreciation.
To solve this problem, Notice 89-99 adopts a "heads" the
IRS wins, "tails" the taxpayer loses solution. Notice 89-99 ap-
plies to any situation where the participation in future appreci-
ation is subject to change based on the passage of time, the
aggregate amount of appreciation, or any other factor. In any
situation where the amount of appreciation is determined, the
determination of the transferor's share is made by assuming
circumstances that maximize the share of potential apprecia-
tion attributable to the transferor's interest before the transfer
and minimizes the share of potential appreciation attributable
to the transferor's interest after the transfer. 69 Thus, there
would be a disproportionate transfer if, as of any time and
under any reasonably foreseeable circumstance, the trans-
feror's ratio of appreciation to value before the transfer is
greater than the transferor's ratio of appreciation to value after
the transfer.70
Another major issue dealt with in Notice 89-99 concerns
capital contributions to an enterprise. Notice 89-99 considers
the situation where two or more persons contribute considera-
tion to a common enterprise. At the time of contribution, each
person originates a proportionate share of the rights inherent
in ownership of the enterprise. Notice 89-99 states that if the
persons divide the ownership rights in the enterprise dispro-
portionately, the nature of their ownership interests change
and this may result in a disproportionate transfer covered by
I.R.C. section 2036(c).7 1 The result of this is that an individual
can make a disproportionate transfer of property that the per-
son never owned. 72
69. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 9.
70. Id. In the situation where the transferor's common stock has the rights to the
appreciation in excess of $1,000,000 up to $5,000,000, Notice 89-99 would assume
that the maximum value of the corporation would be $1,000,000. This would maxi-
mize the transferee's share of appreciation and minimize the transferor's. In fact, the
transferor's share of appreciation would be zero.
71. Id. at 9-10.
72. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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7. Deemed Gift
Once a transfer has been made that is covered by I.R.C. sec-
tion 2036(c), what happens when there is a subsequent transfer
of either the transferred or retained interest? The result in this
circumstance was unclear under the original version of I.R.C.
section 2036(c), but TAMRA added a specific provision to
cover this situation.73 This is known as the deemed gift provi-
sion. It applies if either the original transferor transfers any
part of the retained interest or the original transferee transfers
any part of the transferred property to a person who is not a
member of the original transferor's family.74 At the time of
either of these transfers, a deemed gift is made. As a result,
the gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code may also
be brought into play by I.R.C. section 2036(c). 75
In general, the amount of the deemed gift is equal to the
amount that I.R.C. section 2036(c) would have included in the
transferor's estate had the transferor died at the time of the
subsequent transfer. If the transferor or transferee make a
subsequent transfer of only a portion of their interest in the
enterprise, the deemed gift is only a proportional amount.
As a result of this deemed gift provision, once a dispropor-
tionate transfer has been made, there will generally be I.R.C.
section 2036(c) inclusion, either by way of a gift tax or an es-
tate tax.
8. Right of Recovery
TAMRA creates I.R.C. section 2207B, 76 which essentially
provides for a right of recovery for estate and gift taxes from
the transferee for property which was included in the estate of
the transferor due to I.R.C. section 2036(c). 77 In the case of
73. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4) (West 1989).
74. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(4)(A) (West 1989).
75. The Code's gift tax provisions appear in I.R.C. §§ 2501-24 (West 1989).
76. See TAMRA, supra note 4, at § 3031(f)(1) (codified at I.R.C. § 2207B (West
1989)).
77. I.R.C. § 2207B(a)(1) reads as follows:
If any part of the gross estate on which tax has been paid consists of the
value of property included in the gross estate by reason of section 2036, the
decedent's estate shall be entitled to recover from the person receiving the
property the amount which bears the same ratio to the total tax under this
chapter which has been paid as-
A) the value of such property, bears to
B) the taxable estate.
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estate taxes, the transferor may direct by will or by provisions
in a revocable trust, by making specific reference to I.R.C. sec-
tion 2207B, that the provisions of I.R.C. section 2207B will not
apply. 78 This section will not apply to give a right of recovery
against a charitable remainder trust.79
9. Effective Date
When originally enacted, I.R.C. section 2036(c) was effective
for estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1987, but
only in the case of property transferred after December 17,
1987.80 For example, if the two classes of stock in a corporate
freeze have been issued, but not transferred prior to December
17, 1987, the statute will apply.8'
The TAMRA amendments generally have the same effective
date as the original I.R.C. section 2036(c).8 2 There are a
couple of exceptions. The rules relating to the deemed gift
provisions are effective for original transfers made on or after
June 21, 1988.83 The right of recovery (which applies to all
I.R.C. section 2036 transfers), is applicable to non-I.R.C. sec-
tion 2036(c) transfers only after the date of enactment of
TAMRA.8 4
TAMRA also provided a correction period where a transfer
could be undone to avoid a possible I.R.C. section 2036(c) in-
clusion. There were two possible actions that could have been
taken. First, action could have been taken to have I.R.C. sec-
tion 2036(c) not apply to the transaction. Second, the original
transferor and spouse could dispose of their entire interest in
the enterprise. The action must have been taken prior toJanu-
ary 1, 1990.85
Finally, TAMRA provides a safe harbor for freezes that were
completed prior to the effective date of I.R.C. section 2036(c).
The safe harbor arises in situations similar to this: The owner
of preferred stock has a right to a noncumulative dividend and
decides not to declare the dividend. Because the dividend is
78. See I.R.C. § 2207B(a)(2) (West 1989).
79. See I.R.C. § 2207B(e) (West 1989).
80. See OBRA, supra note 3, at § 10402(b).
81. See OBRA CONF. REP., supra note 39, at 1743.
82. See TAMRA, supra note 4, at § 3031 (h)(1).
83. See TAMRA, supra note 4, at § 3031(h)(2).
84. See TAMRA, supra note 4, at § 3031(h)(3).
85. See TAMRA, supra note 4, at § 3031(h)(4).
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not declared, the corporation in effect is increased in value by
the money not taken out of the corporation. This increases the
value of the common stock owned by the younger generation.
An argument could be made that the older generation has in
effect made a transfer by not declaring a dividend.
TAMRA says that in the case of a failure to pay dividends,
that failure to pay will not be treated as a subsequent transfer.
This safe harbor also applies to any failure to exercise a right
of conversion or any other rights that could cause I.R.C. sec-
tion 2036(c) to apply.86
III. WHAT Is LEFT AFTER I.R.C. SECTION 2036(c)?
I.R.C. section 2036(c) has significantly limited the ability of
an individual to transfer an interest in property and at the
same time keep control of and/or an income interest in the
property and have all post-transfer appreciation kept out of the
individual's estate. In each of the three estate freezing tech-
niques described above,8 7 the transferor gives up more poten-
tial appreciation than income interest. As a result, all of the
post-transfer appreciation will be taxed in the transferor's
estate.
With a corporate recapitalization, the transferor gave up the
entire right to appreciation, while keeping a large portion of
the income. The same is true of the partnership freeze. Both
fall squarely within the parameters of the statute.
With a sale of a remainder interest, again the income interest
is retained while the appreciation has been transferred. With
the broad definition of enterprise, it is clear that it includes
real estate. Sales of remainder interests are also covered by
the statute.
As long as the proportion of the income interest kept is
greater than the proportion of the potential appreciation kept,
I.R.C. section 2036(c) will cause the entire interest to be in-
cluded in the transferor's estate. Another example of where
the statute will apply is where a parent owns a substantial inter-
est in a corporation and makes a gift of $10,000 worth of pre-
ferred stock to a child and the transferred stock has more
rights to appreciation and less of income than any other rights
86. See TAMRA, supra note 4, at § 3031(h)(5).
87. See supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
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in the corporation that the parent owns. Nothing in I.R.C. sec-
tion 2036(c) excludes gifts that qualify for the annual
exclusion. 8
8
What follows is a discussion of other potential family trans-
actions and the application of I.R.C. section 2036(c) to them.
A. Split Purchases
I.R.C. section 2036(c) applies when an individual has made a
transfer of an interest in an enterprise. If there has been no
transfer, then the statute does not apply. One area that may
not involve a transfer is a split purchase, although Notice 89-
99 does take a contrary view.89 With a split purchase, the older
generation taxpayer buys a life estate in property and the
younger generation purchases the remainder interest in the
property. There is no transfer from one generation to the
next; there is a simultaneous purchase by each generation from
a third party.
Notice 89-99 gives an example of a split purchase 90 and indi-
cates that this constitutes a disproportionate transfer of poten-
tial appreciation. Based on reasoning previously discussed, 9'
Notice 89-99 compares the proportionate undivided share of
ownership rights in the enterprise originating with the
purchase with the share of each right actually allocated to the
transferor. Each purchaser has the potential to purchase an
equal share of the income and the appreciation. However, in a
split purchase, the transferor is getting none of the apprecia-
tion rights in the property. As a result, Notice 89-99 holds that
a disproportionate transfer occurs. 92
This reasoning of the IRS may be improper. In the House
version of TAMRA, the substantial interest test was amended
88. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982).
89. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 10. An issue arises as to what authority
Notice 89-99 has. The IRS considers notices to have the same authority as revenue
rulings and revenue procedures. See Rev. Rul. 87-138, 1987-2 C.B. 287. Notice 89-
99 indicates that the notice is an administrative pronouncement and that the notice
may be relied upon in the same manner as a revenue ruling or a revenue procedure.
A position taken in a notice would generally be binding upon the IRS, but not neces-
sarily upon the taxpayer. See Banoff, Dealing with the "Authorities ": Determining Valid
Legal Authority in Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns and Avoiding
Penalties, 66 TAXES 1072, 1102 (Dec. 1988).
90. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 10 (example 16).
91. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
92. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 10.
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to apply if the transferor held a substantial interest either
before or after the disproportionate transfer.93 The TAMRA
House Report gives two examples of the application of this
amendment.9 4 The first example concerns a parent who con-
tributes cash or publicly traded securities to a corporation in
exchange for preferred stock. The child owns the common
stock. If, after the transfer, the parent or a member of the par-
ent's family together own ten percent or more of the voting
power or income stream of the corporation, the substantial in-
terest test is met. The second example is an example of a split
purchase. 95
The Senate version of TAMRA96 did not have this provision.
TAMRA does not contain the House language and the
TAMRA Conference Report specifically says it does not adopt
the House language, but the "conferees understand that sec-
tion 2036(c) applies if a parent transfers an existing enterprise
or assets from such enterprise to another enterprise in which a
child owns a disproportionately large share of potential appre-
ciation and in which the parent retains an income interest or
other rights." 97 The split purchase example is not mentioned.
Additionally, a split purchase should be viewed in light of
the purposes of the statute. Notice 89-99 indicates that Con-
gress had three concerns in enacting I.R.C. section 2036(c):
the undervaluation of property for transfer tax purposes; the
shift of wealth without the imposition of a transfer tax; and al-
lowing a transferor to exclude appreciation from his or her es-
tate without parting with the enjoyment of the property.98 The
split purchase does not raise any of these concerns.
There is no undervaluation issue here. The property is
purchased at arms-length from a third party. Each interest is
valued according to the appropriate valuation tables. As long
as the transaction is bona fide, there is no valuation issue.
There has been no shift of wealth in a split purchase. As-
suming that the child did not receive the consideration from
93. See H.R. 4333, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H6333, 6407 (daily
ed. Aug. 4, 1988). Section 204(s)(4)(A) of this bill would have amended I.R.C.
§ 2036(c)(3), the provision which defines substantial interest.
94. See TAMRA H. REP., supra note 8, at 424.
95. Id.
96. See S. 2238, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
97. See TAMRA CONF. REP., supra note 34, at 5134.
98. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 5.
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the parent for the purchase of the remainder interest, no
wealth has been transferred from the parent to the child. If the
parent did furnish the money for the remainder purchase, then
the parent has shifted wealth to the child; the substance of the
transaction is similar to the parent purchasing the entire inter-
est in the property and gifting the remainder interest to the
child.99 Without the furnishing of consideration by the parent,
both parties have paid fair value for their respective interests in
the property.
Finally, there is no appreciation excluded from the parent's
estate. Instead, the parent has elected to purchase an asset
that does not appreciate. This is quite different than taking an
asset the parent currently owns and making a transfer to keep
appreciation of that asset out of the parent's estate. The child
has simply bought an asset that produces no current income.
There are any number of assets that a person could buy that
generate no current income and have the potential to appreci-
ate in value.
Even though arguments exist to exclude joint purchases
from I.R.C. section 2036(c), the IRS obviously does not agree
with those arguments. As a result, the use of a joint purchase
would be an aggressive estate planning technique.
B. Outright Sale
One technique for limiting the size of a taxpayer's estate that
is still available is an outright sale of a business or income pro-
ducing property to the younger generation. A complete sale
for cash leaves the transferor with no interest in the enterprise
and I.R.C. section 2036(c) would not apply. The issue is not as
clear if the sale is on terms other than all cash. However, there
is a specific statutory safe harbor that excepts certain noncash
purchases from I.R.C. section 2036(c). 0 0 The safe harbor is
known as the qualified debt exception. 10
99. This would likely then be an indirect transfer under I.R.C. § 2036(c). See
Gordon v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 309 (1985) (Substance of transaction was that tax-
payer purchased the entire bond and transferred remainder interest to trust. Trust
never had funds of its own to purchase remainder interest.).
100. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(A)(i) (West 1989).
101. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C) reads as follows:
Qualified Debt.-For purposes of this paragraph ... the term "qualified
debt" means any indebtedness if-
(i) such indebtedness-
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The statute lists several requirements for debt to be quali-
fied debt. To be qualified debt, the debt must unconditionally
require the payment of a sum certain in money in one or more
fixed payments on specified dates and be for a term no longer
than fifteen years (thirty years in the case of indebtedness se-
cured by real estate). 102 The debt can be payable on demand if
it is issued for cash used to meet the normal business needs of
the enterprise. 03 The only amount that can be paid under the
loan is interest at a fixed rate or at a rate which bears a fixed
relationship to a specified market interest rate. 0 4 The interest
payment dates must be fixed. 10 5
The debt cannot be subordinated to the claims of general
creditors. 10 6 However, the debt can be subordinated to the
claims of one or more specified creditors. 0 7 The holder of the
debt cannot be granted voting rights and the terms of the debt
cannot place limitations on the rights of others to vote, unless
(I) unconditionally requires the payment of a sum certain in money
in 1 or more fixed payments on specified dates, and
(II) has a fixed maturity date not more than 15 years from the date of
issue (or in the case of indebtedness secured by real property, not more
than 30 years from the date of issue).
(ii) the only other amount payable under such indebtedness is interest
determined at-
(I) a fixed rate, or
(II) a rate which bears a fixed relationship to a specified market inter-
est rate,
(iii) the interest payment dates are fixed,
(iv) such indebtedness is not by its terms subordinated to the claims of
general creditors,
(v) except in a case where such indebtedness is in default as to interest
or principal, such indebtedness does not grant voting rights to the person to
whom the debt is owed or place any limitation on the exercise of voting
rights by others, and
(vi) such indebtedness-
(I) is not (directly or indirectly) convertible into an interest in the
enterprise which would not be qualified debt, and
(II) does not otherwise grant any right to acquire such an interest.
The requirement of clause (i)(I) that principal be payable on 1 or more spec-
ified dates and the requirement of clause (i)(II) shall not apply to indebted-
ness payable on demand if such indebtedness is issued in return for cash to
be used to meet normal business needs of the enterprise.
Id.
102. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(i) (West 1989).
103. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C) (West 1989).
104. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(ii) (West 1989).
105. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(iii) (West 1989).
106. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(iv) (West 1989).
107. See TAMRA CONF. REP., supra note 34, at 5134; Notice 89-99, supra note 25,
at 12.
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the debt is in default.' 0 8 Finally, the debt cannot be converti-
ble into or have any right to acquire an interest that is not qual-
ified debt.' 09 In addition to the statutory requirements for
qualified debt, the legislative history adds one other. The debt
must constitute debt within the generally accepted meaning of
that term." 10
The Senate Committee Report indicates that there were sev-
eral reasons for the qualified debt exception. Qualified debt is
easily valued, it presents limited opportunity for the subse-
quent transfer of wealth and does not constitute retained en-
joyment of the enterprise."' Notice 89-99 says that these
factors from the Senate Report will.be used to determine if
debt not coming within the statutory safe harbor is still not a
I.R.C. section 2036(c) retained interest."t 2 The issue for plan-
ners, then, is how can you structure a sale in a manner most
favorable to your client, while avoiding I.R.C. section 2036(c).
Several alternatives may be available.
As a means of transferring wealth to the younger generation
through an installment sale, the transferor has the option of
cancelling any installments as they come due. This would still
be income to the transferor but the installments give the trans-
feror opportunities on an annual basis to make use of the
$10,000 exclusion for gift tax purposes. Ahother possible op-
tion the transferor has is to make any notes cancellable upon
the transferor's death, in order to keep the value of the install-
ment notes out of the transferor's estate. This, however, is an
aggressive estate planning technique."i 3
C. Start-up Debt and Working Capital Loans
TAMRA created statutory exceptions for the loaning of capi-
tal to a business for use within the enterprise. One of the ex-
108. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(v) (West 1989).
109. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C)(vi) (West 1989).
110. See TAMRA H. REP., supra note 8, at 424-25.
111. See id. at 424.
112. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 12.
113. See, e.g., Estate of Moss, 74 T.C. 1239 (1980) (self-cancelling installment note
not included in decedent's estate; was a nonfamily transaction and a premium was
built into the purchase price for the self-cancelling feature). See also Rev. Rul. 86-72,
1986-1 C.B. 253 (gain is recognized in decedent's estate on amount of obligation
cancelled at death); Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 12 (self-cancelling installment
notes do not meet the definition of qualified debt).
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ceptions is called start-up debt." 14
For this exception to apply, the debt must unconditionally
require the payment of a sum certain in money and be received
in exchange for cash to be used in any enterprise involving the
active conduct of a trade or business. 1 5 In addition, the per-
son making the loan must not at any time have transferred any
property which was not cash to the enterprise or transferred
customers or other business opportunities to the enterprise
and has not at any time held an interest in the enterprise that
was not start-up debt." 6 The person receiving the debt must
participate in the active management of the enterprise. Fi-
nally, the same rules for qualified debt relating to voting rights
and conversion rights apply to start-up debt.'
7
The IRS has expanded the availability of the start-up debt
exception. Notice 89-99 modifies some of the literal language
of I.R.C. section 2036(c) and provides further safe harbors.
For example, Notice 89-99 determines that previous incidental
transfers to the enterprise and transfers occurring in the ordi-
nary course of business are allowable." t8 Notice 89-99 also
clarifies the start-up debt exception by noting that the excep-
tion is not limited to an actual start-up situation and that trans-
fers occurring more than three years prior to the acquisition of
the start-up debt will not be a prohibited transfer under I.R.C.
section 2036 (c)(7)(D)(ii)(III).
Notice 89-99 also creates a limited safe harbor for certain
preferred interests received in exchange for debt transferred
to a new enterprise. The rules for this exception give it limited
applicability.' ' 9 Essentially, the preferred interest must be
structured just like debt. Perhaps the only benefit of a pre-
114. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(D) (West 1989).
115. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(D)(ii)(I),(II) (West 1989).
116. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(D)(ii)(III) (West 1989).
117. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
118. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 12. Incidental transfers include a parent
making an automobile available for occasional use in a child's personal service busi-
ness. Id. at 7 n.15. Transfers occurring in the ordinary course of business include a
child's restaurant purchasing fruits and vegetables from parent's wholesale market
among other sources and a child's gasoline service station acquiring petroleum prod-
ucts from parent's tank farm even if parent is the only provider of petroleum prod-
ucts in the area (assuming that the parent provides products to other service stations
owned by unrelated parties on similar terms). Id. at 7 n.16.
119. See, e.g., Mahon, Blitzkrieg on Family Business, TRUSTS & ESTATES, Feb. 1989, at
10, 16 ("Qualified start-up debt appears to be a safe harbor to be avoided.").
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ferred interest is that it can be subordinated to the interests of
creditors.
The other statutory exception concerns debt issued in return
for cash to be used to meet normal business needs of the en-
terprise and the debt is payable on demand. In such situations,
the debt must meet the requirements of qualified debt, except
that the requirements that the principal be payable on one or
more specified dates and that the debt have a fixed maturity
are excepted. 20
D. Buy-Sell Agreements
A common means of transferring business interests between
generations is the use of a buy-sell agreement. I.R.C. section
2036 (c) (7) (A) (iii) creates a safe harbor for the use of buy-sell
agreements. The safe harbor applies only if fair market value
is paid for the property as of the time the purchase is
consumated.
One of the principal purposes of a buy-sell agreement is to
fix the price for the sale at the time of the agreement to help
achieve certainty and to avoid difficult valuation issues at the
time the sale actually occurs. However, with this statutory ex-
ception, it appears that the purchase price of the property sub-
ject to the buy-sell agreement cannot be finally determined
until the sale itself occurs.' 2 1
Notice 89-99 does provide limited relief from the strictness
of this rule. A buy-sell agreement will qualify for this safe har-
bor if the sales price is determined by a formula that is based
on currently acceptable valuation techniques and is reasonably
expected to produce a valuation that approximates the fair
market value of the property at the time the sale is consum-
mated. 2 2 Notice 89-99 further states that "[a] good faith buy-
sell agreement that adopts a formula generally recognized as
suitable to the valuation of the type of property involved and
acceptable in arm's-length negotiations taking place at the time
the agreement is executed meets the requirements of the safe
harbor."1 2
3
120. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(C) (West 1989).
121. See generally Hale, Hintze & Salley, Buy-Sell Safe Harbor Under Section 2036(c)
Limited in Scope, J. TAx'N, July 1989, at 20.
122. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 13.
123. Id.
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Prior to the passage of I.R.C. section 2036(c), there were
two basic requirements for the price in a buy-sell agreement to
be respected for estate tax purposes:
1) The decedent was obligated to sell the stock during
lifetime to the other parties to the agreement at the same
price as the price to be paid upon death; and
2) The agreement was entered into for bona fide busi-
ness reasons, and not as a device to pass the value of a busi-
ness to the objects of the decedent's bounty for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth. ' 2
4
With the expansion of the safe-harbor by Notice 89-99, it is
uncertain what the differences are between the old buy-sell
rules and the new buy-sell rules.
E. Private Annuities
An option for the transfer of property that may still be avail-
able is the private annuity. In a private annuity, the older gen-
eration would sell an asset to the younger generation. The
younger generation would pay for the asset by agreeing to
make payments either for the life of the transferor or the life of
the transferor and the transferor's spouse.
All the elements of an I.R.C. section 2036(c) transaction are
clearly apparent, with one exception. Has the transferor re-
tained an interest in the income of or rights in the enter-
prise? 125 The legislative history is silent as to whether an
unsecured liability of the transferee would be a right to the in-
come of the enterprise. Notice 89-99 says that "an interest in
the income of an enterprise may be embodied in any form of
interest (present or future), agreement, or arrangement, in-
cluding, without limitation, a preferred equity interest in the
enterprise, a promissory note, a life or term interest, an em-
ployment agreement, a retirement arrangement, a sale agree-
ment, and a lease agreement."' 26 This passage does not clarify
the status of a private annuity. The only reference to a private
annuity in Notice 89-99 is that it may be covered by I.R.C. sec-
tion 2036(c). 1 27 However, a private annuity should probably
124. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1976).
125. Retention of interest provision appears in I.R.C. § 2036(c)(1)(B) (West
1989).
126. Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 10, 11.
127. Id. at 5.
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not be covered by I.R.C. section 2036(c).
With a private annuity, the only interest retained by the
transferor is an unsecured promise by the transferee to make
payments pursuant to the terms of the annuity.128 If the trans-
feree defaults, the only recourse the transferor has is to sue the
transferee. Once a judgment has been obtained, then the
transferor may have the ability to use the enterprise as a means
of collecting the judgment.
There is minimal potential for abuse with an annuity. The
value of the annuity is based on the life expectancy of the
transferor, and I.R.C. section 7520 prescribes tables which
give the appropriate value. The only potential for abuse exists
on the value of underlying property sold, but the potential ex-
ists equally in any transfer of property, including the statutorily
created exceptions.
F. First Death Freezes
There may still be planning opportunities available with es-
tate freezing upon the first spouse's death. For example, as-
sume one spouse owns all the preferred and common stock of
a corporation. At that spouse's death, the preferred stock
passes to the surviving spouse and the common stock passes to
the children. Notice 89-99 indicates that the surviving spouse
will not be a transferor for purposes of I.R.C. section
2036(c). 2 9 As a result, while all of the stock is included in the
estate of the first spouse to die, only the preferred (non-appre-
ciating) stock is included in the surviving spouse's estate. This
post-death freeze will not work if the surviving spouse is given
a nonfiduciary power to allocate the assets between the two
shares. 3
0
In the situation where the common stock is passed to the
children, it could potentially have a value in excess of
$600,000. As a result, there may be estate taxes owing on the
death of the first spouse. Traditional estate planning strategy
attempts to limit estate tax payments to the death of the sec-
ond spouse. However, with assets that have large appreciation
128. The annuity cannot be secured. If it is, the entire gain may be recognized in
the year of sale. See, e.g., 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978); Bell v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
129. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 15 (example 39).
130. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 15 (example 40).
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potential, it may be better to pay some tax at the first death,
thereby avoiding a potentially larger estate tax at the second
death. This possibility should at least be considered in any
comprehensive estate planning analysis.
As with any first death planning, it is not always possible to
predict who will die first. There are two possible approaches
to take. The estates could be divided equally between the
spouses, so that at least one-half of the corporation could be
frozen at the first death. Otherwise, if there is a strong possi-
bility that one spouse will die first, it may be appropriate to
transfer the corporate stock to that spouse.'1
3
G. Grantor Retained Income Trusts
One estate planning technique that was specifically left via-
ble by a statutory exception was the grantor retained income
trust (GRIT). In a GRIT, the transferor places property into a
trust and retains an income interest for a specific term of years,
or until the transferor's death, whichever comes first. At the
end of the term, the trust terminates and the property passes
to the remainder beneficiary.
A GRIT presents two ways to save transfer taxes. First, the
amount subject to gift tax is only the value of the remainder
interest. That value is determined by subtracting the entire
value of the property transferred to the trust by the actuarial
value of the transferor's retained income interest. The second
tax savings occurs only if the transferor outlives the term of the
trust. If this happens, none of the appreciation in value of the
property is taxed to the transferor.
TAMRA created a specific safe harbor for certain GRITs.132
In order for the safe harbor to apply, the income beneficiary
must have a qualified trust income interest, which is "any right
to receive an amount determined solely by reference to the in-
come from property held in trust."'133 In addition, the term of
the trust can be no greater than ten years, the transferor must
be the person receiving the income interest, and the transferor
131. Unlimited gifts can be made between spouses at anytime prior to death, with-
out incurring a gift tax liability. See I.R.C. § 2523 (1982). As long as the transfer to
the deceased spouse occurs one year prior to that spouse's death, the stock retrans-
ferred back to the surviving spouse will get a step-up in basis. See I.R.C. § 1014(e)
(1982).
132. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(6) (West 1989).
133. Id.
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cannot be a trustee of the trust.' 34 This exception was added
to TAMRA by the Conference Committee and the legislative
history on this provision is limited.
One common planning technique used with a GRIT is to
give the transferor a contingent right of reversion or a contin-
gent general power of appointment if the transferor died
before the term of the trust ended. This would increase the
value of the transferor's retained interest, thereby decreasing
the value of the gift of the remainder interest.13 5 Read liter-
ally, I.R.C. section 2036(c) would not allow the transferor to
retain either of these interests. However, Notice 89-99 pro-
vides that a contingent reversion or general power of appoint-
ment will be allowed if the value of the reversion or power
does not exceed twenty-five percent of the value of the re-
tained income interest, determined without regard to the value
of the reversion or power.13 6
Congress indicated that the statutory exceptions are safe
harbors and transactions that fall out of the safe harbors will
not necessarily come within the reach of I.R.C. section
2036(c).13 7 Notice 89-99 indicates that the IRS will determine
if a transaction that is not specifically covered by a statutory
safe harbor will be reached by I.R.C. section 2036(c) based on
an examination of all relevant facts and circumstances.138 One
area of interest is how the IRS will consider the fact and cir-
cumstance of a trust established for longer than ten years.
There is no direct authority on the use of a GRIT of more
than ten years. However, Notice 89-99 indicates that a trust
would be considered an enterprise because it is an arrange-
ment to hold and manage property. 139 For example, assume a
parent transfers $10,000 of stock of a publicly traded company
to a GRIT, retaining an income interest for a period of fifteen
years. Assume also that the actuarial value of the income inter-
est exceeds ten percent of the value of the trust. Since it is the
trust in which the parent has an interest, the parent then has a
substantial interest in an enterprise. There has also been a dis-
134. Id.
135. See Montgomery & Hicks, Estate Freeze-What's Left After Section 2036(c)?, 5
TAX MNGMT. FIN. PLAN. J., 127, 134 (Apr. 4, 1989).
136. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 11, 12.
137. See TAMRA H. REP., supra note 8, at 424.
138. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 11.
139. See id. at 6.
[Vol. 16
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss2/3
LR.C. 2036(c)
proportionate transfer of appreciation, and a retained interest
in the income of the trust. As a result, I.R.C. section 2036(c)
would literally apply.
H. Employment and Other Agreements
Under a statutory safe harbor, the existence of an agreement
for the sale or lease of goods or other property to be used in
an enterprise or the providing of services to the enterprise will
not be a retained interest if:
1) the agreement is an arm's length agreement for fair
market value;
2) the consideration for the agreement cannot be deter-
mined by reference to gross receipts, income, profits or sim-
ilar items of the enterprise; and
3) the agreement does not otherwise involve any change
in interests in the enterprise.1 40
In addition, for compensation for services performed after a
transfer of an enterprise, the agreement cannot be for a term
longer than three years.' 4 '
Read literally, the statute seems to say that a parent cannot
have such an agreement in conjunction with a transfer of the
enterprise by the parent. However, Notice 89-99 only applies
this requirement to the issuance of preferred stock and similar
equity interests as compensation for entering into the agree-
ment or for services performed under the agreement. 142 If an
agreement otherwise complies with the requirements of this
safe harbor, but is in excess of three years, it will not be a re-
tained interest if the agreement is terminable by the employer
at will or for reasonable cause.' 43
Notice 89-99 indicates that a covenant not to compete will
be considered an agreement for the performance of serv-
ices. 144 Therefore, if an agreement for the transfer of an enter-
prise contains a covenant not to compete in order to get the
transferee a current income tax deduction, the agreement can.
be no longer than three years.
140. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(A)(ii), (B)(ii) (West 1989).
141. See I.R.C. § 2036(c)(7)(B)(i) (West 1989).
142. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 13.
143. Id. It has also been noted that the "term of the agreement does not include a
period for which the agreement is extended by mutual agreement." TAMRA H.
REP., supra note 8, at 427.
144. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 13.
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I. Transfers of NonEnterprises
Notice 89-99 has carved out an exception to the definition of
enterprise that will allow a freeze of some assets. For example,
a person's residence is not an enterprise.145 As a result, any
freezing type transaction with a personal residence will not
come under I.R.C. section 2036(c).
Perhaps the most significant nonenterprise, from an estate
planning perspective, is life insurance. Notice 89-99 conclu-
sively presumes that life insurance is not an enterprise. 46 As a
result, there are still options available for the use of life insur-
ance as an estate planning device.
One example of the continued use of life insurance is the
irrevocable life insurance trust. While not used as an estate
freezing device, the irrevocable life insurance trust still could
be covered by the literal language of I.R.C. section 2036(c).
With an irrevocable life insurance trust, the grantor of the
trust either transfers money to be used to purchase life insur-
ance or transfers an existing life insurance policy to the trust.
The trust is irrevocable, and the grantor makes sure that he or
she retains no incidents of ownership in the life insurance.'
47
The grantor may on an annual basis transfer money to the
trust sufficient to pay the premiums on the life insurance. The
trust may contain a "Crummey"' 148 provision, which will allow
the annual contributions to the trust to qualify for the annual
gift tax exclusion.
Upon the death of the grantor, the life insurance will not be
included in his or her estate, while the proceeds are distributed
as if the insurance was owned by the grantor at death. De-
pending on the amount of insurance and the size of the estate,
the estate tax savings can be enormous.
The enactment of TAMRA left the issue of the applicability
of I.R.C. section 2036(c) to life insurance trusts in doubt.
However, Notice 89-99 specifically gives an example of a life
145. See id. at 7.
146. Id.
147. If the transferor retains any incidents of ownership, the life insurance will be
included in the transferor's estate by reason of I.R.C. § 2042 (1982).
148. Named after the case Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968). A Crummey power is essentially a right to demand a withdrawal from a trust.
The right is only in existence for a limited period of time, and if it is not exercised, it
lapses. This right to demand may be sufficient to consider a contribution to a trust to
be a gift of a present interest.
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insurance trust and indicates that I.R.C. section 2036(c) does
not apply.'
4 9
Another estate planning technique using life insurance is the
split dollar policy. The split dollar policy is a way of shifting
both the benefits and costs of life insurance among two parties.
For example, a corporation will buy a life insurance policy on
the life of an employee. The corporation will pay the premi-
ums due on the policy, while the employee is the party who
names the beneficiary of the policy.
On the death of the employee, the policy proceeds are split
between the corporation and the beneficiary, with the corpora-
tion getting an amount equal to the premiums it paid with the
remainder going to the beneficiary. This allows the employee
to get a fairly significant amount of insurance at a relatively low
cost.
As with life insurance trusts, the use of split dollar is not an
estate freezing device. However, because of the split owner-
ship feature, there is a sort of transfer of disproportionate ap-
preciation, and an argument could be made that I.R.C. section
2036(c) should apply. However, there is a specific example of
split dollar insurance in Notice 89-99, and the Notice indicates
that I.R.C. section 2036(c) is not applicable.' i 0
J Transfers That Are Not Disproportionate
If a transfer is not disproportionate, I.R.C. section 2036(c)
does not apply. For example, if the parent transfers fifty per-
cent of the income and fifty percent of the appreciation, there
has been no disproportionate transfer. As the parent gets
older, the amount of income needed will presumably decrease,
thereby allowing further proportionate transfers. If the busi-
ness is increasing in value, the value of the transfers will also
increase, using up a larger amount of the parent's unified
credit. However, with transfers made on an annual basis, there
will be the continued use of the annual exclusion amount.
K Office Furniture Exception
One area of concern for newly graduated law students is how
to furnish their new offices. It has been common for parents
149. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 7, 8 (example 7).
150. Id. at 8 (example 8).
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either to loan or give children furniture to use in the child's
law practice. However, with the passage of I.R.C. section
2036(c), there was some concern that this practice would be
covered by the statute. It appeared that the loaning of furni-
ture to the law practice would make the parent a transferor
with regard to the enterprise. 15 1 With the rules of attribution
and the lack of an exception for bona fide transfers between
family members, there was a strong possibility that the entire
value of the law practice would be included in the parent's
estate.152
Concern over this issue was so great that representatives
from student bar associations throughout the country lobbied
heavily with the IRS for a satisfactory resolution of this impor-
tant issue. The IRS was originally planning to consider such
furniture transfers to be within the ambit of I.R.C. section
2036(c), but this view was eventually tabled. The IRS finally
resolved that "the fact that parent gives or loans office furni-
ture to child for use in child's law practice does not make par-
ent a participant in child's enterprise."'' 5 3
CONCLUSION
I.R.C. section 2036(c) appears to have put an end to the
traditional forms of estate freezes. How far it has gone beyond
this is uncertain. Even with the legislative history and Notice
89-99, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the
scope of I.R.C. section 2036(c). Options are available that ac-
complish some, but not all of the goals of an estate freeze.
However, until there is further clarification of the statute, the
estate planner will be unable to predict the results of any trans-
action not falling precisely within one of the safe harbors.
151. It was always assumed that the graduating law student's practice was prop-
erty which may produce income or gain.
152. It was always assumed that this value would be significant.
153. See Notice 89-99, supra note 25, at 7.
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